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Introduction 
This paper tries to measure the effect of cooperation on economic growth of both China 
and Japan by setting up an econometric model. This measuring is based on the basic 
framework of cooperation economics (Huang shao-an,2000) . The structure of the paper 
is as follows: The first part introduces the basic idea and analytical methods of 
cooperation economics: the second part establishes an econometric model for measuring 
the effect of cooperation on economic growth of both China and Japan: The third part 
nleasures degree of cooperation between China and Japan from two dimensions which 
are political factor and bilateral trade between China and Japan, and lists all the 
macroeconomic data that the econometric model needs: The fourth part employs the 
econometric model and the macroeconomic data to calculate the effect of cooperation on 
economic growth of both China and Japan: the final part is a brief conclusion. 
1. Basic framework of cooperation economics 
From the very beginning, the research of economics was always focused on 
"competition", so we can call economics as economics of competition. Nowadays, although 
people are still competing among each other, "cooperation" among people has been more 
and more. In other words, the propensity of cooperation becomes stronger along with 
accumulation of mankind's knowledge and increase of rationality. Now many people find 
that they can solve the problem through cooperation other than through competition, and 
even better. Therefore, economics should strengthen the research toward cooperation, 
and try to build economics concerning "cooperation" (I-Iuang shao-an,2000) . 
In fact, some action we think as competition is cooperation in essence. For example, the 
division of labor is taken as competition superficially, but in fact it is made for getting 
"cooperative residual". Institutional economics points out that one of the basic functions of 
institution is to reduce conflict or antinomy in order to provide a solution for the 
cooperation among people. Moreover, establishment of reciprocal institution has the 
character of "path dependence". The evidence given by Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2002) prove that the propensity of reciprocity are of vital importance to bilateral 
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negotiation, working of market system, the structure of property rights and contracts, 
and cooperation and collective action. As a result, studying cooperation and establishing 
economics concerning "cooperation" is the frontier issue of modern economics. 
In the history of mankind, the cooperation among people can be divided into three 
stages. 
The motive to cooperation of the first stage came from natural pressure, which forces 
mankind to evolve the preference to cooperate. Internalization of social norms was 
established through self-constraint under the pressure of natural forces. Therefore, we 
can call this stage "lawmaking by nature". 
Along with continuous increase of productivity of mankind, the pressure imposed by 
nature began to decrease, and the expanding cooperation institution can not hold on 
solely relying on self-constraint. This is the second stage of cooperation. In this stage, 
though internalized social norm was still functioning, punishment institution has a unique 
role in maintaining cooperation institution. Therefore some scholars call this stage 
"lawmaking by individual". 
In modern society, division of labor brought by Industrial Revolution caused radical 
change in the field of cooperation in both scale and degree. This kind of cooperation 
should be based on judicial institution which is in turn based on rationality and 
democracy. Therefore, we call this stage "lawmaking by society". 
In order to establish cooperation economics, we should solve some basic questions. Of 
course, it is a systemic task and we only do some tentative discussion. 
(1) Basic assumptions of cooperation economics 
Traditional economics has two basic assumptions: the assumption of resource scarcity 
and assumption of rationality. We still reserve these assumptions, but we need do some 
modification. 
The assumption of resource scarcity 
Scarcity of resource is always the reason for existence of economics. The eternal issue 
of economics is to realize utility maximization under the condition of scarce resource. The 
traditional economics pays attention to "competition", which can promote the efficiency of 
resources. But we also should know that competition sometimes may result in severe 
waste of resources. The means to realize utility maxin1ization is not restricted to 
competition. Along with the accumulation of knowledge and experience, the mankind has 
already discovered that under many circumstances, cooperation is advantageous to 
competition. Cooperation brings higher efficiency than con1petition under many 
circumstances: the partners can get more cooperative residual. 
The assumption of interest-pursuing agent 
Cooperation is not contradictory to the assumption of rational agent. Both competition 
and cooperation are the rational choice of mankind. If cooperation is more advantageous 
than competition, then people may choose cooperation. Both com'petition and cooperation 
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are means to realize one's interest. 
Assumption of increasing rationality 
We oppose the assumption of rationality which is the trait of neo-classical economics. 
Later, Simon et al substitute "bounded rationality" for "rationality", which is accepted by 
most economists. However, both the conception of rationality and bounded rationality are 
static conceptions, which do not realize that mankind's rationality may change along with 
accumulation of knowledge and experience. The assumption of "increasing rationality" we 
advance here is a dynamic and changing conception. Up to now, knowledge has been 
accumulated, and mankind's skill of learning has been increasing. We can solve many 
problems which we at past solved by competition because of lack of information. The 
famous "prisoner dilemma" is an example for imperfect information, uncumulative 
knowledge. But under the assumption of "increasing rationality", we can indirectly learn 
other's experience and avoid "prisoner dilemma" (Huang shao-an,2000) . 
(2) Methodology of cooperation economics 
The basic mythology of cooperation economics can be boiled down to "cooperationism, 
Reciprocity and liberalism", which are different from and related to "individualism, 
utilitarianism and liberalism". In fact, "individualism, utilitarianism and liberalism" is the 
precondition of "cooperationism, Reciprocity and liberalism". The aim of mankind's 
cooperation is the judgment and pursuit of utility. But "cooperationism and Reciprocity" 
goes further than "individualism and utilitarianisnl" and illustrates the nature of 
cooperation. "cooperationism" is based on "individualism" (I-Iuang shao-an,2000) . 
The utility which cooperation pursues is more extensive than the utility which 
competition pursues. Under some circumstance, cooperation is advantageous to partners 
of cooperation and the essence of cooperation is "Reciprocity". 
Of course, we do not hold that only "pursuit of self-interest" can explain the action of 
cooperation. The latest study of institution economics shows that many actions of 
mankind, such as "volunteering to give blood", do not come from "Reciprocity", but 
embody the nature of human. Polanyi pointed out the motive of reciprocity is not self-
interest, but fear of being despised or excluded by others. Reeves pointed out that one of 
presuppositions is that "life of mankind is a tiny, interdependent and stable social group". 
2. Two econometric models measuring the effect of cooperation on 
economic growth of both Cl1ina and Japan 
The econometric model based on Cobb-Douglas production function is as follows: 
InCY;) =~o+ ~llnCK;) +~2InCL;) +u;,i=China,]apan (1) 
Y;, K;, L; is the output, capital and labor based on fixed price respectively. t is the time 
series. We argue that white noise uf (i=China,]apan) includes the effect of cooperation 
between China and Japan on ytChina, y{apan. This paper tries to abstract this factor from ut, 
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and analyze the effect of this factor on economic growth of both China and Japan. 
It is difficult to quantify "factor of cooperation" by time series, so we don not adopt the 
method that factor of cooperation directly comes into model (1) as Control- variant. And 
it is also difficult to find observable Instrument variable and employ IV estimation. We 
employ dummy variable to abstract the effect on economic growth of cooperation. The 
basic idea is as follows: for different years t,tE (1,2, .. .n) , the degree of cooperation is 
obviously different, and the degree of cooperation has effect on economic growth of both 
China and Japan. To distinguish "the degree of cooperation" is easier than quantifying 
"the degree of cooperation" by time series. Obviously, the degree of cooperation in 
peaceful period is much higher than that during war time. The degree of cooperation 
during normalization of diplomatic relation between China and Japan is higher than that 
during non- normalization of diplomatic relation between China and Japan. And the 
degree of cooperation during normalization of diplomatic relation between China and 
Japan is higher that during the period of political friction. The degree of cooperation is 
higher during the period of higher degree of open-up of bilateral trade between China and 
Japan. Of course, we can dig more factors to depict the degree of cooperation between 
China and Japan. It is not wise to precisely depict the degree of cooperation between 
China and Japan of each year. The method we employ here is to classify n years to four 
ranks: the year of basically no cooperation (Co) : the year of weak-cooperation (Cl) : the 
year of relatively strong-cooperation (C2 ) : the year of strong-cooperation (C3 ) • And the 
concrete classification is in part three. Cl '\ C2 '\ C3 come into the model (1) by dummy 
variables. 
In(Y;) ={3o+ {3lln(Kf) +{32In (Lf) + AIC1,t+ A2C2,t+ A3C3,t+ v;,i=China,]apan (2) 
0If tECj, Cj,t=l: if ttlCj, Cj,t=O;]= 1,2,3 X denotes a matrix of row n (row t denotes 
year t) five columns (respectively In (Kf) '\ In (Lf) '\ Cl,t '\ C2 ,t '\ C2,t) 0 equation (2) should 
satisfies: 1) E(v:lX)=O,t=1,2, ... n:2) Var(v:lX)=Var(v;)=a 2 ,t=1,2, ... n:3) Corr(v;, v1lx) 
=O,t =1=5: 4) vt is independent of X, and v; 0 Normal (0 = ( 2 ) 0 
According to (2), the meaning of Aj,j =1,2,3 is . 
Aj=ln(Y;ICj:K:,L:) -In(Y;ICo:K:,L:) ,jE (1,2,3) (3) 
It can be deduced from (3) ~: 
(Y;ICj;K;,L;) - (Y;ICo;K;,L;) = (A) -1 (4) 
(Y;ICo:K;,L;) xp ] 
The meaning of equation (4) is that ceteris paribus, relative to basically no-cooperation 
(Co), when the degree of cooperation is Cj, average of output is higher by per cent100· 
[exp (Aj) - 1 ] 0 
Based on this conclusion, we can establish a time series which can help to analyze the 
effect of cooperation on economic growth of both of China and Japan. We define time 
series Ct as follows: 
24 
Tradet,t E Co 
=Ct jTradet +Tradet . [exp (;U) - 1 J,tE Cj 
Tradet is the value of bilateral trade between China and Japan in year t. the value of 
bilateral trade between China and Japan may be the easiest observable variable 
describing the degree of cooperation. In this time series, we introduce factor [exp (Aj) 
-1 ] by additional rule. Ct includes both [exp (Aj) -1 ] and Tradef, so it can better depict 
the degree of cooperation than [exp (Aj) - 1 ] or Tradet. 
Now, we set up SVAR model to analyze the effect of Ct on output of both of China and 
Japan (yfhina,\ yJapan) . The model of SVAR can describe linear lagged relation of multi-
variable stationary series. We define a SVAR model of three-variable. 
BoYt=llYt-l+ 12Yt-2+···+ IpYt-p+ Et, t =1,2, "·n 
In (Yfhina) 1-b12 -b13 
,m =: 1,2,3, ...pYt = In (Ct ) ,Bo= - bIb- 23 
In (y Japan) 
-b31 -b32 1 (6) 
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Equation (6) requires: 1) In (yfhina) '\ In (Ct) '\ In (y Japan) is stationary stochastic process: 
(2) Et is the vector of white noise: (3) cov (Ert, Est) = 0, r =1=5 0 So we need exert k (k-
1) /2 constraint model. Lag rank p is decided by information rule of AIC and SC. We can 
employ AR Roots to test stability. We suppose that the role of In (YtChina) '\ In (Ct ) '\ In 
(y /apan) has a lagged effect, so the effect between every two variables is tiny ( this do not 
mean that the effect among three variables is tiny) . So we can deduce three constraint 
conditions: 1) b12 =O: 2) b32 =:O: 3) b13 =O. 
Then we introduce the method of decomposition by Cholesky, and we can prove that: 
First, the instant effect of cooperation factor (In (C t )) on Chinese economic growth (In 
(Y China)) .. d(q) - 3 ' (yChina) / 3 t -1 2 . Th I t' ff t' ~ d(q)t IS. China- In t+q E2t, -, ,···n, e cumu a 1ve e ec IS q=l China 0 
Secondly, the instant effect of cooperation factor (In (C t )) on Japanese economic 
g!owth (In (YJapan)) is: dJ~~an=: 31n (Yf'r;n) /3E2t, t==1,2,···n: The cumulative effect is 
L d(q) 
q= 1 Japan 0 
3. Measuring of degree of cooperation and data 
Data 1: the year of basically no cooperation (Co) : the year of weak-cooperation (Cl) . 
the year of relatively strong-cooperation (C2 ) : the year of strong-cooperation (C3 ) • 
We depict the degree of economic cooperation between China and Japan by two 
dimensions which are 1) the degree of political cooperation and 2) the degree of 
economic cooperation. 
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(1) The degree of political cooperation 
According to main events in history, we divide the period of 1960-2006 to four sub-
periods: 
1960-1971: the premier Zhou-enlai put forward three principles of Sino-Japanese 
political relationship, which created the precondition for Sino-Japanese bilateral trade. But 
during this period China and Japan were in the status of basically no cooperation. 
1972-1982: in 1972, China and Japan realized the normalization of Sino-Japanese political 
relationship. And in 1978, China and Japan subscribed a long-term trade agreement. 
1982-1996: the leaders of China and Japan visited each other frequently, and the 
economic relationship is fine. But there were many political frictions during this period. 
1996-2006: the politicalrelationship was inclined to worsen. 
We refer to concrete events happened each year to quantify the degree of cooperation 
between China and Japan. 
Table1: measuring of degree of cooperation between China and Japan 
(political factor) 
The degree The degree The degree The degree 
of political of political of political of political 
cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation 
year (full mark10) year (full mark10) year (full mark10) year (full mark10) 
1960 1 1972 6 1984 8 1996 5 
1961 1 1973 6 1985 7 1997 7 
1962 1 1974 6 1986 7 1998 7 
1963 1 1975 6 1987 8 1999 7 
1964 1 1976 6 1988 8 2000 7 
1965 1 1977 6 1989 6 2001 6 
1966 1 1978 8 1990 8 2002 6 
1967 1 1979 8 1991 8 2003 6 
1968 1 1980 8 1992 8 2004 6 
1969 1 1981 8 1993 8 2005 6 
1970 1 1982 7 1994 6 
1971 1 1983 8 1995 6 
(2) Value of bilateral trade between China and Japan 
We employ Value of bilateral trade between China and Japan to measure the degree of 
cooperation between two countries. The reasons are as follows: 1) the political factor is 
hard to be quantified, which may cause inaccuracy: 2) political factor can not fully 
illustrate the degree of economic cooperation. For instance, the relationship between China 
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and Japan from 1994 to now is a good proof. Therefore, we introduce Value of bilateral 
trade between China and Japan as second dimension to measure the degree of cooperation. 
Table2: Value of bilateral trade between China and Japan (fixed price, unit: 1 billion 
yen; based on year 2000) 
1960 15.93 1972 562.811 1984 2497.667 1996 6546.332 
1961 31.985 1973 783.17 1985 3667.083 1997 7312.738 
1962 57.71 1974 1048.086 1986 2338.366 1998 7205.598 
1963 92.026 1975 1191.439 1987 2096.863 1999 7524.476 
1964 208.149 1976 910.431 1988 2309.413 2000 9215 
1965 312.582 1977 926.586 1989 2451.408 2001 10889.001 
1966 403.061 1978 1073.301 1990 2327.694 2002 13074.074 
1967 356 1979 1372.042 1991 2751.792 2003 16191.781 
1968 347.742 1980 1701.671 1992 3328.78 2004 18931.322 
1969 387.475 1981 1808.961 1993 3925.961 2005 21301.945 
1970 491.978 1982 1710.696 1994 4521.531 
1971 526.898 1983 1890.772 1995 5258.937 
We define the value of bilateral trade in 2005 as 10, and the value of bilateral trade in 
other years is divided by the value of bilateral trade in 2005. 
Table 3: the measuring of degree of cooperation between China and Japan 
(economic factor) 
The degree of The degree of The degree of The degree of 
economic economIC economIC economIC 
cooperation cooperation cooperation cooperation 
year (full mark10) year (full mark10) year (full mark10) year (full mark10) 
1960 0.01 1972 0.26 1984 1.17 1996 3.07 
1961 0.02 1973 0.37 1985 1.72 1997 3.43 
1962 0.03 1974 0.49 1986 1.1 1998 3.38 
1963 0.04 1975 0.56 1987 0.98 1999 3.53 
1964 0.1 1976 0.43 1988 1.08 2000 4.33 
1965 0.15 1977 0.43 1989 1.15 2001 5.11 
1966 0.19 1978 0.5 1990 1.09 2002 6.14 
1967 0.17 1979 0.64 1991 1.29 2003 7.6 
1968 0.16 1980 0.8 1992 1.56 2004 8.89 
1969 0.18 1981 0.85 1993 1.84 2005 10 
1970 0.23 1982 0.8 1994 2.12 
1971 0.25 1983 0.89 1995 2.47 
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We sum up above two measuring (each measuring as 50%) to gain total measuring (10 
as full mark) , then we classify the whole period of 1960-2005: 
6---10 : Strong cooperation 
4---6 : Relatively strong cooperation 
2---4 : Weak cooperation 
0---2 : Basically no cooperation 
Table: 4 the total measuring of degree of cooperation between China and Japan 
(including political factor and economic factor) 
year measuring degree year measuring degree 
1960 0.51 Basically no cooperation 1983 4.45 Relatively strong cooperation 
1961 0.51 Basically no cooperation 1984 4.59 Relatively strong cooperation 
1962 0.52 Basically no cooperation 1985 4.36 Relatively strong cooperation 
1963 0.52 Basically no cooperation 1986 4.05 Relatively strong cooperation 
1964 0.55 Basically no cooperation 1987 4.49 Relatively strong cooperation 
1965 0.58 Basically no cooperation 1988 4.54 Relatively strong cooperation 
1966 0.6 Basically no cooperation 1989 3.58 Weak cooperation 
1967 0.59 Basically no cooperation 1990 4.55 Relatively strong cooperation 
1968 0.58 Basically no cooperation 1991 4.65 Relatively strong cooperation 
1969 0.59 Basically no cooperation 1992 4.78 Relatively strong cooperation 
1970 0.62 Basically no cooperation 1993 4.92 Relatively strong cooperation 
1971 0.63 Basically no cooperation 1994 4.06 Relatively strong cooperation 
1972 3.13 Weak cooperation 1995 4.24 Relatively strong cooperation 
1973 3.19 Weak cooperation 1996 4.04 Relatively strong cooperation 
1974 3.25 Weak cooperation 1997 5.22 Relatively strong cooperation 
1975 3.28 Weak cooperation 1998 5.19 Relatively strong cooperation 
1976 3.22 Weak cooperation 1999 5.27 Relatively strong cooperation 
1977 3.22 Weak cooperation 2000 5.67 Relatively strong cooperation 
1978 4.25 Relatively strong cooperation 2001 5.56 Relatively strong cooperation 
1979 4.32 Relatively strong cooperation 2002 6.07 Strong cooperation 
1980 4.4 Relatively strong cooperation 2003 6.8 Strong cooperation 
1981 4.43 Relatively strong cooperation 2004 7.45 Strong cooperation 
1982 3.9 Weak cooperation 2005 8 Strong cooperation 
According to table 4, Co, Cl' C2 , C3 is as follows: 
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Basically no cooperation (Co) 1960 -1971 
Weak cooperation (Cl) 1972 -1977 : 1982 : 1989 
Relatively strong cooperation (C2 ) 1978 -1981 : 1983 -1988 : 1990 - 2001 
Strong cooperation (C3 ) 2002- 2005 
9 
8 
7 
Cl) 
~ 
bO 6 
Cl) 
0 
c 5 
0 
:;:: 4~ 
Cl) 
a. 38 
0 2 
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Year 
Chart 1: the total measuring of degree of cooperation between China and Japan 
(time series) 
We can see from chart 1 that the total measuring of degree of cooperation between 
China and Japan has been increasing in totally, but the course is devious. 
Data2: Japanese macro-economic data (K {apan,L {apan) . 
Table 6: Japanese macro-econon1ic data 
year 
GDP fixed 
price (based on 
year 2000) 
unit : 1 billion yen 
employment 
unit: 10 
thousand 
Stock of fixed 
assets unit: 1 
billion yen 
Deflator 
(year 
2000==100) 
Stock of fixed 
assets (based on 
year 2000) unit: 1 
billion yen 
1960 \i< '7AtlQt\ ~A 
'i'<,i:"",, """" 'ii. 4436 53.0 
1961 83282.50 4498 53.5 
1962 ::i .·.Q.o·ild~'Q· 4556 52.7 
1963 98387.90 4595 53.6 
1964 ,i 111YX,,'7,QU i , 4655 53.7 
1965 116270.00 4730 54.1 
1966 "'i,.< •• )1··.zx6~03QO: 4827 55.5 
1967 142896.00 4920 56.4 
1968 
.""., 
...... ' ...... 
iIi! t}I7:'tJ:lI:~1J) 5002 56.9 
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1969 181432.00 5040 241,045.5 58.1 414880.379 
1970 2()0861~00 5094 294,784.5 60.2 489675.249 
1971 210300.00 5121 349,849.8 59.7 586013.065 
1972 227993.00 5126 469,108.8 60.2 779250.498 
1973 246307.00 5259 620,063.3 69.8 888342.837 
1974 243289.00 5237 682,969.6 91.7 744786.914 
1975 250811.00 5223 737,424.2 94.4 781169.703 
1976 260780.00 5271 811,957.8 99.2 818505.847 
1977 272229.00 5342 876,735.5 101.1 867196.340 
1978 286581.00 5408 980,815.6 98.6 994741.988 
1979 302297.00 5479 1,160,107.7 105.8 1096510.113 
1980 310815.00 5536 1,336,823.2 124.5 1073753.574 
1981 319672.00 5581 1,473,575.7 126.3 1166726.603 
1982 329722.00 5638 1,565,530.5 128.5 1218311.673 
1983 337200.00 5733 1,623,371.8 125.7 1291465.235 
1984 350135.00 5766 1,697,371.5 125.4 1353565.789 
1985 365416.00 5807 1,804,568.1 123.9 1456471.429 
1986 362620.80 5853 2,081,070.0 112.6 1848197.158 
1987 376382.21 5911 2,540,129.7 108.4 2343293.081 
1988 401843.62 6011 2,763,129.4 107.3 2575143.896 
1989 423104.88 6128 3,152,070.6 110.1 2862916.076 
1990 445112.56 6249 3.473,167.1 112.3 3092757.881 
1991 460026.93 6369 3,360,057.4 111.6 3010804.122 
1992 464498.30 6436 3,183,423.1 109.8 2899292.441 
1993 465648.34 6450 3,151,583.4 106.7 2953686.410 
1994 470764.08 6453 3,139,830.2 104.5 3004622.201 
1995 480223.21 6457 3,118,492.0 103.5 3013035.749 
1996 496718.47 6486 3,100,345.9 103.6 2992611.873 
1997 505517.05 6557 3,139.440.4 105.2 2984258.935 
1998 500224.64 6514 3,072,823.5 103.6 2966045.849 
1999 499546.67 6462 100.1 
2000 511462.29 6446 100.0 
2001 512501.47 6412 99.1 
2002 510949.31 6330 97.2 
2003 517619.22 6316 94.9 
2004 531594.95 6329 96.1 
2005 536538.50 6356 97.7 
2006 548264.90 6382 
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Data 3 : Chinese macroeconomic data: KtChina, L~hina 
Table 7: Chinese macroecononlic data 
Stock of fixed assets GDP fixed price employment (based on year 2000)
unit: 1 billion RMB unit: 10 thousand year unit: 1 billion RMB 
/ .. :/ .:::'.• i:: 
>: Q.••• /1960 : iT· 
. 
25880 604.808 
1961 213.94 25590 690.116 
..g.g'•••.••••••• ,.,1962 ••.••••••••• 
., 
25910 731.818 
1963 221.66 26640 766.889 
1964 /< ...•••,..\. ·.·'··,···,····•.••,••••••••••••••••••• ••• •••"··2Q§t7 i\ ...·. 27736 813.994 
1965 298.77 28670 882.758 
1966 "!IIf//>.: ·iIO,74 29805 962.174 
1967 311.89 30814 1023.142 
.'." ..."'.""1968 
,.. ,.. ,.. fl ' 31915 1064.004 ' ... '.'.' .."'.""."""" 
1969 349.65 33225 1114.07 
1970 :'1,.48 34432 1202.299., ......•.........'...'....•.•.....'................................'...••...'...." ..........•.•'......•" ....•..•••.•....,..••......................... 
1971 446.71 35620 1314.798 
1972 35854 1428.833~\\\ii::i:!§!'F~ ~.~ 
1973 500.31 36652 1560.365 
... <..1974 I:.· .....: .. " ..../,.,..............:.,' \i. 1:82 37369 1707.876 
1975 556.35 38168 1869.609 
.,.:: .... / 
.... ,." .. :1976 t 547.45 38834 2041.316 
1977 589.05 39377 2229.051 
... ,... :: .. ,,: // ...':.1978 :: 657.97 40152 2459.089 
.........,."." .."",., 
1979 707.98 41024 2726.955 
.i::i;«&K·/h:{ 'l.( I1980 
.:, .. : .. ::. ../. 42361 2749.123 
1981 802.89 43725 3010.024
. 
1982 i875J95 45295 3282.205 
1983 971.43 46436 3589.606 
1984 iJ"ll ~OR 48197 3956.292 
1985 1270.16 49873 4425.89 
1986 //://1381.93 51282 5031.834 
1987 1542.24 52783 5750.49 
1988 </1i'16.51 54334 6541.187 
1989 1786.89 55329 7322.575 
1990 1854.79 64749 8063.517"'.' ..•...........•.........•••.•••....•,. 
1991 2025.43 65491 8829.038 
......',::/::i9~lR,041992 66152 9688.779 
1993 2636.87 66808 10705.46 
1994 ....• '~ ..••••••••••·,2982.30 67455 11899.89 
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1995 3307.37 68065 13282.37 
1996 > 
.,",' 
3638~lO 68950 14928.66 
1997 3976.45 69820 16829.48 
1998 4286.61 70637 18906.68 
1999 4612.39 71394 21167.54 
2000 I>·· 
.....,.'., >. 4999.84 72085 23609.16 
2001 5414.82 73025 26185.96 
2002 5907.51 73740 29001.02 
2003 6498.33 74432 
2004 7154.66 
2005 
2006 
4. Results of econometric models 
Table: 8 The result of model (2) 
i = China i =Japan 
AI- 0.010149 0.007342 
A2 - 0.078722 0.030067 
A3 - 0.091484 0.070762 
Notation: prominence only on 15%1 • 
We put the mean of Al' A2' A3 in equation (5) ,and we can gain a time series . 
1 The result we get here is not ideal. We argue that there are two reasons for this. First, 
the sample we employ is small, if we can expand to the period of 1914~2006, then we 
can get a better result. Secondly, we do not include education factor in our model. We can 
improve the results if we can get more data. 
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Test of stationarity of model (6) 
We test unit value by seeing In (YtChina)" In (Ct )" In (Y Japan) as a time series. 
Table 9 
Cross-
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -5.65388 0.0000 3 130 
Breitung t-stat 2.23194 0.9872 3 127 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
lm, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -3.31101 0.0005 3 130 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 42.5468 0.0000 3 130 
pp - Fisher Chi-square 42.2922 0.0000 3 134 
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Hadri Z-stat 8.03186 0.0000 3 137 
Determining lag-rankp of model (6) 
We adopt LR" AIC" SC" HQ to determine lag-rankp, the test result is as following: 
Table 10 
Lag LogL LR AIC SC HQ 
0 -57.95601 NA 2.835163 2.958038 2.880476 
1 194.4595 457.8701 -8.486491 -7.994993 -8.305241 
2 218.1530 39.67283* -9.169909* -8.309788* -8.852723* 
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We adopt LR, AIC, SC, HQ to determine lag-rank, all the tests except HQ show that 
we should define that p equals 2 0 
Test of stability of model (6) 
We adopt AR to test stability of the model, and the results is as follows : 
Table 11 
Root Modulus 
0.988517 0.988517 
0.864692 0.864692 
0.670434 - 0.326254i 0.745603 
0.670434 + 0.326254i 0.745603 
0.299478 0.299478 
0.076397 0.076397 
We can see from table 11 that the reciprocal of all eigenvalues (except unit root) is in the 
field of unit circle, so the model is stable. 
The solution of model: the effect of cooperation on economic growth of China and 
Japan 
(1), The time path of instant effect of cooperation on economic growth of both of China 
and Japan. (q=100~) 
Chart 3: The time path of instant effect of cooperation on economic growth of both of 
China and Japan. (q = 100) 
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In chart 3, LNYChina and LNYJapan describe the instant effect of cooperation between 
China and Japan on econonlic growth of China and Japan respectively. Both of the effects 
are positive. 
(2) . Chart 4 the time path of accunlulative effect of cooperation on economic growth of 
both of China and Japan (q =400) . 
Chart 4: the tin1e path of accumulative effect of cooperation on economic growth of 
both of China and Japan. (Q=400) 
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In chart 4, LNYChina and LNYJapan describe the accumulative effect of cooperation 
between China and Japan on economic growth of China and Japan respectively. Both of 
the effects are positive, and the effect on China is greater than on Japan. 
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Conclusion 
The econometric model we adopt shows that during the period from 1960 to 2005, 
cooperation between China and Japan played a remarkable active role in promoting 
economic growth of both China and Japan, and the increase of the degree of cooperation 
between China and Japan has positive effect in promoting econonlic growth of both China 
and Japan (both instant effect and accumulative effect) . From the aspect of GDP, 
cooperation between China and Japan has greater effect on China than on Japan2. Ceteris 
paribus, relative to basically no cooperation, the average of output under the condition of 
weak cooperation is greater by 0.87 percent, and the average of output under the 
condition of relatively strong cooperation is greater by 5.4 percent, and the average of 
output under the condition of strong cooperation is greater by 8.1 percent3. 
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3 By putting the data of table 8 in equation (4) . 
36 
